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Protection of Individual Investors Under
U.S. Securities Laws: The Impact of
International Regulatory Competitiont
J. WILLIAM HICKS*
Internationalization is the most significant development in the securities
markets of the United States and many other countries. Until recently
transnational market linkages have been limited primarily to North America,
Western Europe, and Japan. Today, as a result of political change
throughout the world, including the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin
Wall, and because of continuing technological advances in communication,
a "global market economy" has actually materialized. With the
disappearance of economic barriers, investors are experiencing new choices
in the selection of financial services and investment instruments. The
phenomenal growth in the complexity, volume, and availability of financial
and investment products and services has prompted many new governmental
and private controls of securities markets and securities transactions. Not
surprisingly, some of these regulations and constraints conflict. Striking a
proper balance between the protection of investors and securities markets
and the forces of a free market economy has produced an international
regulatory competition with obvious economic benefits to those that succeed.
The participants in this regulatory competition include private individuals
and private organizations, such as stock exchanges, trade associations,
business corporations, nation states and their authorized agencies or
representatives, cooperative groups of nation states, such as members of the
European Community, and signatories to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and international organizations such as the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
U.S. participants in the international regulatory contest face many
challenges in their efforts to ensure that domestic issuers, market
intermediaries, and investors remain competitive in transnational investment
opportunities and cross-border securities transactions. In general, these
t Copyright 1994 by J. William Hicks. All rights reserved. Requests to copy this article for
any use should be made directly to the author.
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challenges necessitate a reassessment of the present domestic regulatory
scheme. Diverse global regulations call into question U.S. securities law
policies that tolerate multiple levels of governmental and private controls of
our capital and trading markets. A more specific and fundamental
challenge, and the one that is the focus of this article, stands at the threshold
of such a reassessment. It calls for domestic regulators and other policy
makers to determine where ordinary individual investors, as opposed to
institutional and other sophisticated investors, fit within the hierarchy of
interest groups who benefit from U.S. securities regulation. The issue seems
especially important in view of recent efforts by U.S. regulators, principally
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), to reform
securities law in ways that suggest that the goal of protecting ordinary
individual investors has yielded in significance to the goal of ensuring
vibrant and competitive U.S. securities and capital markets in the global
economy.'
Strong arguments exist for preferring the interests of ordinary individual
investors over other interest groups in any regulatory reform of U.S.
securities laws. First, the origin and history of federal securities statutes are
clear evidence that U.S. securities laws were intended to protect investors.
As articulated by Congress2 and the courts,3 the mission of these federal
statutes and of the SEC, the federal agency that was created to administer
1. See infra text accompanying notes 10-87.
2. See, e.g., the preamble to the 1933 Act which states: "An Act to provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails,
and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No.
22, § 1, Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (Preamble). Section 2 of the 1934 Act contains the following statement of
purpose for the statute:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly conducted
upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions
and of practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by officers, directors, and
principle security holders, to require appropriate reports, to remove impediments to and
perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a national system for
the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and
funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and
control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the national
credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking
system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets
in such transactions. ...
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. See, e.g., United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61, (1990).
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them, is to promote the public interest in orderly, free, and fair securities
markets and to assure the protection of investors. There is no doubt that the
intended primary beneficiaries of these laws were members of the public
generally and not specialized groups within the securities industry. The
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the four
other federal statutes which in the aggregate are often referred to as federal
securities law, were designed to rectify the abuses that had occurred in the
years leading up to the 1929 crash of the stock market and to restore
investor confidence in the core tenets of the free enterprise system. 4 One
might fairly argue that unless Congress decides to abandon the original
objectives of these federal statutes, domestic reformers must honor and
promote the "public interest" and "protection of investors" as the two
dominant considerations in the operation and regulation of our securities
markets. Second, the integrity of the U.S. securities markets is grounded on
the perception by ordinary investors that securities law prohibits any
participant in these markets to reap an unfair advantage. Domestic reform
that makes it easier for certain segments of the investing public to realize
profitable investment opportunities, or for unscrupulous individuals and
firms to manipulate securities prices and to deceive ordinary investors,
threatens the very heart of the capitalist system. In the opinion of some
observers, including state securities administrators, many of the SEC's
reforms during the past decade have been in response to items on an
industry "wish list" and have failed to address concerns of the individual
investor.5
On the other hand, a number of competing factors support a less
prominent status for ordinary investors among interest groups seeking
benefits under reformulated securities laws. First, institutional investors
have access to all of the financial and securities markets, but ordinary
investors have a more limited choice. In addition to the stock market, which
has subsidiary markets for equity securities such as initial public offerings
4. The following six statutes form the basis for federal securities laws: Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a
to 7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-
6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77bbb (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to 80a-64 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
and Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. See, e.g., statement by Maureen Thompson, legislative director of the North American
Securities Administrators Association on December 30, 1992, in GSA Reform, Leftover Issues Said to
Top Legislative Agenda, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 48, 50-51 (Jan. 15, 1993).
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and private placements, the principal financial markets in both primary and
secondary transactions consist of the money market, the government
securities market, the municipal securities market, the corporate debt market,
and the derivative products markets. Arguably, ordinary investors should
not object to diminished protection with respect to securities transactions in
markets where their participation is limited or nonexistent.
Second, the nature of markets where ordinary investors do participate
has changed dramatically in the past decades. For example, in 1975,
American households dominated share holdings in the U.S. equity market
with seventy percent of the total equities outstanding. As of 1990,
institutional investors, such as investment companies, insurance companies,
pension funds, and bank trust departments, held fifty-three percent of all
equities.6  The evidence suggests that the trend toward increased
institutional ownership of equities will continue. Given the changes in
direct ownership of securities by individual investors between the 1930s,
when the basic federal securities statutes were enacted, and the 1990s, it
seems appropriate for domestic reformers to recognize the growing
institutionalization of the markets in reformulating securities laws.
Third, U.S. securities regulation depends heavily upon self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), such as the stock exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which in part retain their
effectiveness by serving the interests of their constituencies. The interests
of SROs are important to the national economy. At times, however, these
interests are incompatible with the interests of ordinary individual investors.
Certain compromises that favor the interests of the SROs over those of
ordinary individual investors are, therefore, both inevitable and desirable.
Finally, most of the substantive principles in U.S. securities law, which
provide important protection to investors, are typically the toughest in the
world. These regulations represent costs that many firms and investors, both
domestic and foreign, find burdensome. U.S. standards of regulation are
being challenged by increasing competition among the international
securities markets. Unless U.S. policy makers are prepared to eliminate or
modify current standards as part of a move toward internationalization of
regulatory standards, domestic participants in the financial and securities
markets will suffer economically. Therefore, one might argue,
6. U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30920 [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,012, at 82,907 (July 14, 1992).
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harmonization of standards is inevitable and, in order for it to be in accord
with "the public interest," it will have to be achieved through diminished
protection for ordinary investors.
Part I of this article explores the changing character of investor
protection for ordinary individuals in the context of federal regulation of
primary securities offerings, a market that always has included both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. It examines this topic through
the policy implications of statutory and administrative regulations that
circumscribe registered public securities offerings, exempted private
placements, and limited offerings of securities. Part II continues the
exploration of investor protection and the proper measure to be accorded
individuals who purchase and sell securities, but shifts the inquiry from the
relative simplicity of restructuring securities law at the national level to the
complexity of reformulating that law in response to, or in anticipation of,
international regulatory competition. It reviews viable approaches to the
global challenges to traditional U.S. securities law and recommends a
response that continues to offer investor protection for ordinary individuals
in markets and transactions where they face special risks.
I.
U.S. securities regulation is derived from federal and state statutes, from
administrative interpretations of those statutes by the SEC, other federal
agencies, and by state securities commissioners, and from judicial
constructions of legislative and administrative pronouncements. The
combined body of law offers protection to the investing public by regulating
companies (issuers) that offer securities for purchase and that allow a trading
market in those securities to develop. Investor protection is achieved by
means of mandated periodic disclosure by the issuer and certain key insiders
or affiliates of the issuer,7 by registration and regulation of market
intermediaries, such as stock exchanges8 and broker-dealers,9 and by
administrative and judicial sanctions against any investor who violates the
7. Periodic reporting by issuers is regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(a), 78o(d) (1988); periodic reporting by affiliates and key insiders is dictated by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) and 78p(a) (1988).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78k, 78q, and 78gg (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o and 78q (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
1994]
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substantive principles of securities law including the statutory registration
and antifraud provisions. The level of protection that domestic securities
law accords ordinary investors, typically individuals, as opposed to
institutional and other sophisticated investors, has not remained constant
during the past sixty years of federal legislation in this area. The following
discussion examines one area of federal regulation-the offer and sale of
securities by an issuer to members of the public-a market where individual
investors always have participated and where standards of regulation are
being challenged by international competition for capital markets. The
purpose of this survey of federal law as it applies to issuer offerings is
simply to demonstrate one example of a shift in emphasis in investor
protection that has occurred in U.S. securities regulation and to suggest that
similar transformations are occurring in other areas of securities law. It is
not intended as a commentary on the wisdom behind such changes. Part II
examines the normative dimension of this issue in the broader context of the
adaptation of domestic securities law standards by U.S. policymakers in the
face of global regulatory competition.
A. The 1933 Act
Issuer offerings of securities are regulated primarily by the Securities
Act of 1933. Section 5 of that statute protects prospective purchasers of
securities by requiring the seller to provide them "full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities" to be sold.'" Under Section 5, no person may
offer or sell securities to the public until it complies with a registration
procedure that calls for the filing of a registration statement, including a
disclosure document referred to as a "prospectus," with the SEC." As
contemplated by Congress, the SEC staff is to review and correct all
deficiencies in the documents filed by the registrant prior to the effective
date of the registration statement. Finally, Section 5 contemplates that a
copy of the prospectus, as corrected to reflect SEC staff comments and any
material changes of fact that have occurred during the registration period,
be given to each investor prior to sale, or in some cases, at the time of
delivery of the security after sale.
10. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (Preamble).
11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, 77j (1988).
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Congress, however, did not intend for the registration and prospectus
delivery obligations of Section 5 to reach every securities transaction by an
issuer or other participant in the securities markets. Sections 3 and 4 of the
1933 Act provide the legislative relief.'2 Of particular interest to issuers
are the so-called transactional exemptions in the statutory provisions which
permit an issuer to offer and sell unregistered securities under circumstances
where, for a variety of reasons, Congress believed that full compliance with
Section 5 was unnecessary. 3  In order to qualify for one of these
exemptions the issuer must prove that it has satisfied all of the
conditions. 4 Even where a transactional exemption is available, the issuer
is still subject to the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Section 3(a)(l 1) exempts intrastate offerings by any issuer organized and
doing business in the state where it plans to distribute its securities. 5 The
offering must be restricted to persons residing in that state. The intrastate
exemption, as Section 3(a)(l 1) is sometimes called, is but one of the
transactional exemptions that the 1933 Act provides. Issuers can also
consider a limited offering exemption under Regulation A16 or under Rule
504'7 or Rule 5058 of Regulation D. Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act is the
source for these transactional exemptions." It authorizes the SEC to create
additional exemptions if it finds that registration is not necessary for the
protection of investors "by reason of the small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering." In the case of Regulation A
offerings, investor protection at the federal level comes from conditions that
define the issuer as worthy, mandate the delivery of an offering circular
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d, respectively (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
13. Congress distinguished between exempted securities and exempted transactions. Sections
3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) of the 1933 Act provide exemptions which turn on the intrinsic nature of the
issuer or the character of the security itself. As a result, these exemptive provisions eliminate the need
to determine whether the exempted securities are being sold publicly or privately or whether the person
selling them is an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. The other subparagraphs of Section 3 and all of Section
4 identify certain transactions where Congress determined an exemption from Section 5 was appropriate,
provided that all of the conditions of an exemption are satisfied. As a practical matter, most unregistered
securities offerings are structured to comply with one or more of the transactional exemptions.
14. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,
95 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1938).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1988).
16. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1993).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1993).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1993).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1988).
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prior to sale, and limit the amount of an offering to $5 million.2 ° Rule 504
of Regulation D is restricted to relatively small issuers (i.e., those that are
not subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act) which
do not qualify as investment companies or blank check companies and
which offer and sell no more than $1 million of securities annually pursuant
to the Section 3(b) exemption.2 The "limited character" of a Rule 505
offering is retained by conditions which the exemption imposes on
disclosure, manner of offering, the number and quality of purchasers, resale
of securities by investors, and by a ceiling of $5 million on the amount of
securities that can be offered annually under Section 3(b).22 Finally,
issuers can avoid the requirements of registration under the 1933 Act by
qualifying an offering of unregistered securities under Section 4(2), the
private placement exemption. Section 4(2) exempts "transactions by an
issuer not involving a public offering. '23 According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Section 4(2) is limited to issuer offerings that are made to persons
who do not need the protection of registration. 4  Because of the
uncertainty surrounding judicial interpretations of Section 4(2), the SEC
adopted Rule 506 of Regulation D as a non-exclusive safe harbor for issuers
seeking to rely upon Section 4(2).25 Like Rule 505 of Regulation D, Rule
506 contains limitations on disclosure, manner of offering, the number and
quality of purchasers, and the resale of securities sold pursuant to the
exemption. Unlike Rule 505, Rule 506 does not restrict the amount of
money that an issuer may raise in a transaction. 6
Federal regulation of the offer and sale of securities by issuers has
evolved since 1933. The statutory scheme of registration and exemption, as
provided for by Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 1933 Act, has been
supplemented by judicial interpretations of these provisions and a series of
administrative rules that began in the 1970s and has continued to the
present. Some SEC interpretations of these provisions have proven more
successful than others. In many instances where the SEC has liberalized
20. See generally 7A J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933, ch. 5 (rev. ed. 1993) [hereinafter HICKS].
21. See generally id.
22. See id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
24. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124-25.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1993).
26. See generally 7C HICKS, supra note 20, ch. 11.
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standards of regulation and made it easier for an issuer to satisfy conditions
or limitations of an exemption, investors sustained a reduction in protection.
The easier it becomes for issuers to prove compliance with the terms and
conditions of a transactional exemption, the more difficult it becomes for
purchasers to invoke the protections of Section 12(1) of the Act. Under this
civil liability provision, which is discussed in more detail below, investors
have a statutory rescission right for one year following a purchase against
any seller who is unable to sustain the burden of proof that its transaction
was exempted from Section 5.27 Interpretations of Section 12(1) by courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, have further reduced the level of
protection that ordinary investors previously enjoyed.28
The following assessment of investor protection for individual investors
under these judicial and administrative interpretations does not proceed
chronologically. Instead, it contrasts earlier regulations, which legislative
history, judicial opinions, or SEC releases signalled as important for
ordinary investors with regulations that currently apply to registered and
unregistered issuer offerings. The assessment is organized by categories of
regulation which have undergone material alteration in the regulation of
primary offerings over time' (1) restrictions based on the nature and quantity
of investors; (2) disclosure obligations; (3) limitations on the manner of sale;
(4) restrictions on the resale of securities; and (5) private rights of action.
B. Nature and Quantity of Investors
Registered public offerings by issuers are available to all investors
regardless of sophistication, wealth, or experience. In this respect, federal
securities law has not changed since the enactment of the 1933 Act.
However, the conditions as to the number and eligibility of investors under
two of the transactional exemptions, Section 3(a)(1 1) and Section 4(2), have
been liberalized significantly.
Section 3(a)(l 1) has never contained a disclosure obligation as a
condition for exemption from Section 5. However, judicial and
administrative interpretations of the intrastate exemption require the issuer
to limit its distribution of unregistered securities to persons who are
residents of the state where the issuer conducts a predominant amount of its
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(1), 77m (1988).
28. See infra text accompanying note 81.
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business.2 9 The legislative history of this provision is sparse, but it
suggests that by so restricting the transaction to residents of the state where
the issuer's principal business activities are located, the exemption can be
claimed for offerings only in those situations where local offerees and
purchasers are in a position personally to investigate the issuer and its
operations. Furthermore, because the offering is restricted to residents of a
single state, protection is readily available from that state's securities
commissioner who, because of the provision's residency requirement for the
issuer, is in a position to institute enforcement action against the issuer and
its officers and directors and, where necessary, to seize business assets of the
issuer for the benefit of investors.
Early judicial and administrative interpretations of Section 3(a)(l 1)
interpreted residence, for purposes of the offeree and purchaser residency
requirement, to mean domicile. In other words, a person was eligible to
participate in a Section 3(a)(1 1) offering only if the issuer could prove that
the person intended to make his location within the state his permanent
place of abode.30 In 1974, with the adoption of Rule 147, a safe harbor
rule for Section 3(a)(1 1), the SEC abandoned this narrow, subjective test of
residency for offerees and purchasers in favor of a broader and more
pragmatic approach.3' Under Rule 147(d)(2), an offeree or purchaser
qualifies as a resident for purposes of Section 3(a)(1 1) if he or she spends
more time each year in that state than in other parts of the world.
32
In its 1953 opinion in SEC v. Ralston Purina,33 the U.S. Supreme
Court construed the private placement exemption, which is set forth in
Section 4(2), as imposing limitations on both offerees and purchasers. It
also rejected any numerical limitation on the scope of the exemption, saying
that an offering to a few or to many might qualify as public and, therefore,
outside the scope of the provision.34 According to SEC v. Ralston Purina,
an offering is nonpublic if it is limited to persons who can "fend for
themselves."35 Informally, this limitation is construed as restricting Section
4(2) offerings to sophisticated investors, an equally ambiguous term. During
29. See generally 7 HICKS, supra note 20, ch. 4.
30. See id. § 4.05[1][b][i].
31. See id. § 4.05[2].
32. See id. § 4.05[2][b].
33. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
34. Id. at 125.
35. Id.
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the early 1970s, Section 4(2) was subject to restrictive interpretations by
both the courts and the SEC.36 It was generally assumed then that very
few individuals possessed the knowledge and experience to assess the risks
and merits of a prospective investment that fending for oneself appeared to
entail. Because the eligibility requirement of Section 4(2) extended to
offerees and purchasers, an issuer planning a private placement was well
advised to restrict its offering to institutions or to limit the number of
individuals to a few.37 In 1982, with the adoption of Regulation D,38 the
SEC revitalized the private placement exemption and in the process
reinterpreted the group of persons who are deemed to have the capabilities
to fend for themselves. In crafting more expansive guidelines for Section
4(2), the Commission also abandoned a limitation on issuers that it had
successfully urged on the Supreme Court. Under Rule 506 of Regulation
D, an issuer prior to making offers is no longer obligated to make a
subjective determination that each offeree is eligible. 39  Contrary to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Ralston Purina, everyone may be considered a
potential Rule 506 offeree. Rule 506 shifts the focus from the status of each
offeree to the sophistication of each purchaser. Furthermore, the class of
eligible purchasers is broadened with a definition of "fend for himself' that
gives an issuer two choices. A purchaser is presumed to be able to fend for
himself if he qualifies as an "accredited investor,"4 a term that is defined
in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D by objective criteria to include specified
institutions and certain individuals in positions of influence within the issuer
or in positions of economic independence. Because the term "accredited
investor" is incorporated into Rule 506, an issuer is relieved from the need
to make subjective judgments about the suitability of such persons.
Alternatively, a person is an eligible purchaser in a Rule 506 private
placement if, in the reasonable belief of the issuer, he has such knowledge
and experience in financial matters that he is capable of evaluating the risks
36. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp.
v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). See also 7C HICKS, supra note 20, §
11.08[3][c].
37. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Who Killed The Private Offering Exemption?, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 470
(1976).
38. Sec. Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106
(Mar. 8, 1982).
39. See 7C HICKS, supra note 20, § I 1.08[4][a].
40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1993).
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and merits of the prospective investment." The SEC's decision to protect
purchasers and not offerees is reflected again in the elimination of any
concern about the number of offerees to whom the issuer may direct its
offering. Rule 506 permits offers to everyone and sales to an unlimited
number of accredited investors and to thirty-five nonaccredited investors
who otherwise satisfy the traditional subjective standard of sophistication.42
Thus, in the liberalization of both Section 3(a)(1 1) and Section 4(2), the
SEC has affected investor protection in two respects. First, the objective
interpretations of the residence requirement in Rule 147 and the eligibility
requirements of Rule 506 expand the intrastate and private placement
exemptions to permit offerings of unregistered securities to persons who
would not have qualified under earlier interpretations. Second, these
administrative rules reduce the burden of proof for the issuer in the event of
a Section 12(1) rescission suit by purchasers.
C. Disclosure Obligations
As noted earlier, registration under the 1933 Act contemplates the
preparation and delivery of a disclosure document, called a prospectus, to
offerees and purchasers in a public offering. During the period of time
between the filing of the registration statement with the SEC and the date
when it becomes effective, a period lasting about two months, the issuer and
its agents may not sell securities. But during this waiting period, oral offers
are permitted and written offers in the form of the incomplete preliminary
prospectus are allowed. Once the registration statement is declared effective,
a copy of the final prospectus must be delivered to each purchaser prior to
or in conjunction with the sale or, in the event of an oral sale, prior to or in
conjunction with the mailing of the confirmation or the security. The
prospectus delivery obligation is imposed on all broker-dealers, regardless
of their participation in the selling effort, for a fixed period of time that was
designed to approximate the duration of the average public offering.
Four aspects of the disclosure requirements for issuers selling registered
securities are worthy of notice in evaluating the degree of protection that
they afford investors. First, although Congress intended the prospectus
delivery duties to extend to all registered offerings, it authorized the
41. Id.
42. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(e)(l)(iv) and 230.506(b)(2)(i) (1993).
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Commission to modify or eliminate them in situations where, in its opinion,
personal copies of the prospectus were unnecessary. 3  The SEC has
eliminated the prospectus delivery obligations in several designated
instances, including offerings by issuers that are subject to the periodic
reporting requirements of Sections 13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act.'  In
theory, 1934 Act registrants that make registered offerings are already
providing the public securities markets with adequate ongoing disclosure
about themselves so that the delivery of a statutory prospectus to purchasers
is thought to be superfluous. In practice, some investors in a 1934 Act
registrant will be unfamiliar with certain aspects of information about that
company, but because of the SEC's dispensation from the prospectus
delivery duties these investors will not be furnished with the disclosure
contained in the 1933 Act registration statement.
Second, even if the issuer and the market intermediaries are subject to
the prospectus delivery obligations of Section 5, there is no guarantee that
an investor will receive the prospectus prior to the time when he or she
makes an investment decision to purchase. Section 5 permits delivery of the
prospectus after the sale when the issuer or its agent mails to the purchaser
a written confirmation of the transaction or the security itself.4"
Third, issuers preparing a registration statement must be concerned with
both the content of the document to be filed with the SEC and the standard
of disclosing that information. The SEC has prepared forms that specify the
items of information that must be included in a registration statement."
How that information is disclosed is another issue. The SEC has regularly
stated that information in a registration statement is intended not for the
securities professional, but for the "ordinary reasonable investor."47
Despite the ambiguity of this term, the Commission has never attempted to
define it. Given the complexity of certain businesses and the highly
technical nature of certain items of disclosure on the SEC registration
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(B) (1988). See generally 7C HICKS, supra note 20, § 12.05. The
statutory period during which the dealer is obligated to deliver a prospectus may be shortened or
eliminated if the Commission determines that it is unnecessary for the protection of certain investors.
Id. § 12.05(1].
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.174(b) (1993).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(10)(a) (any prospectus confirming the sale of any security) and 77e(b)(I)
and (2) (1988).
46. See generally 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 6011 (May 24, 1993).
47. See. e.g., In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648, 649, 654 (1945).
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forms,48 issuers frequently find this standard of disclosure to be especially
challenging. From time to time the SEC has sought to reduce the legalese
and boilerplate in prospectuses and to make them easier for "ordinary
reasonable" investors to read. For a while the Commission required issuers
to use charts and diagrams to illustrate certain technical information, such
as dilution,49 and it continues to insist on the use of a one-page summary
of the prospectus at the outset of the document."0 Despite these efforts,
much of the disclosure in 1933 Act prospectuses is incomprehensible to
unsophisticated investors.
Fourth, 1933 Act prospectuses do not contain all of the information
about an issuer that is critical for intelligent investment decisions. For more
than thirty years, the SEC took the view that the information contained in
a registration statement should be hard, historical data that could be
objectively verified. Soft, forward-looking information, such as sales
forecasts or income projections, was unacceptable5' even though market
professionals insisted that issuers provide them with this type of disclosure.
The Commission has altered its stance on this point, but because it will not
provide issuers that disclose forward-looking information in a prospectus
with an impregnable defense to claims of misrepresentation by investors
who contend that they were fraudulently misled by such disclosures, issuers
are reluctant to volunteer such data in their 1933 Act filings and the
Commission does not mandate that they do so. 2 Thus, those market
professionals and investors who are positioned to receive such material
information achieve an investment advantage over the ordinary, reasonable
investor who only receives a copy of the final prospectus.
48. See, e.g., item 101 of Regulation S-K, which is incorporated into the basic registration form,
Form S-1, item 11. 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7123 (Apr. 7, 1993).
49. RIcHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 139-43 (5th ed. 1982).
50. See item 503 of Regulation S-K, Form S-1, item 3. 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 17123 (Apr.
7, 1993).
51. See, e.g., Sec. Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I
81,756 (Nov. 7, 1978) (Commission explains its traditional opposition to soft information in registration
statements in the announcement of a revised policy).
52. The SEC has adopted a safe-harbor rule for issuers that disclose forward-looking information
but it does not provide them with total protection from civil liability. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1993).
An issuer of registered securities faces almost absolute liability to purchasers under section 11 of the
1933 Act for any material misstatements in the registration statement at the time it became effective.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(l) (1988). An issuer also faces civil liability for material misstatements under Rule
lOb-5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
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Protection through disclosure does not come with every transactional
exemption. Where an issuer structures its unregistered offering to satisfy the
requirements of the intrastate exemption under Section 3(a)(1 1), the issuer
is not required to give investors a disclosure document. Rule 504 permits
certain small issuers to raise $1 million annually in a public offering of
securities with no disclosure obligations. For several years, the absence of
disclosure in Rule 504 transactions was balanced by conditions that
prohibited general advertising and general solicitation and that restricted
resales for two years after the offering. In 1992, the SEC eliminated these
conditions from Rule 504, but continued to allow public offerings without
any mandated disclosure.53 Rule 505 and Rule 506 of Regulation D
impose disclosure obligations on the issuer, but only with respect to
purchasers who are not accredited investors. Nonaccredited purchasers are
persons who are sufficiently sophisticated to qualify as eligible purchasers
under Rule 506, but do not possess the skill, knowledge, or bargaining
power to demand all of the information that should be reviewed prior to an
investment decision. In order to protect such persons, the issuer in a Rule
505 or Rule 506 transaction must furnish each nonaccredited purchaser with
a disclosure circular that contains "[t]he same kind of information" that
would appear in a registration statement.54 Accredited purchasers are
presumed to have the capability to force the issuer to share with them
whatever information they need and, therefore, they are not entitled to
receive a disclosure statement under these exemptions. As noted earlier, the
categories of accredited investors are broad enough to encompass persons
who are not necessarily able to fend for themselves. Purchasers in a
Regulation A offering receive a disclosure document that resembles a
statutory prospectus in a registration statement. The shortcomings of
prospectuses in registered offerings apply equally to the mandated disclosure
in Regulation A distributions.
53. Sec. Act Release No. 6949, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,439 (July 30, 1992) (hereinafter
Sec. Act Release No. 6949] (adopted); Sec. Act Release No. 6924, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,931 (Mar. 11, 1992) (proposed).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(A) (1993).
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D. Limitations on Manner of Sale
Where securities are to be sold pursuant to an effective registration
statement, the issuer may not commence promotional efforts until the
registration statement has been filed and a preliminary prospectus is
available. Congress decided that during this prefiling period an issuer
should not be able to condition the securities market for its forthcoming
offering." Courts and the SEC have generally honored this legislative
prohibition against advertising and solicitation in the time period leading up
to the registration process. They do so out of fear that investors might be
tempted by gun-jumping activities by the issuer to form a premature opinion
about the prospective securities issue without the benefit of the full
disclosure of material information, favorable and unfavorable, in the
prospectus." The one major qualification, which is dictated by the realities
of modem corporate life, is that during the prefiling period issuers are
permitted to disseminate to the public at large such factual information as
they have regularly released in the past." For example, an issuer that
regularly sends reports to its shareholders may continue to disclose such
information to them even though it is about to file a registration statement
with the SEC. Well-established companies which are in constant
communication with shareholders, securities analysts, and stock exchanges,
enjoy an advantage'in the prefiling period that some smaller, less developed
issuers do not possess. For certain registered offerings, this gap in the wall
of silence that Section 5 imposes on prefiling publicity could prove to be
significant.
When an issuer plans to sell unregistered securities it might find that the
exemption it seeks to invoke requires that no offer to sell securities can be
made through any form of general solicitation or general advertising. When
an exemption contains this prohibition, issuers are unable to engage in the
mass recruitment of prospective purchasers that is permitted in a registered
55. Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act prohibits any offeror to sell a security until a registration
statement has been filed with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1981). Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act defines
"offer to sell" as including every attempt to dispose of a security for sale. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3).
56. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 574-76 (2d Cir.
1970); S.E.C. v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co.,
38 S.E.C. 843, 850-53 (1959).
57. See, e.g., Sec. Act Release No. 5180, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,192 (Aug. 16, 1971).
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public offering after a registration statement has been filed with the SEC.
Unlike the offerees in a registered offering, prospective purchasers in
unregistered offerings are not entitled to receive a statutory prospectus that
has undergone SEC staff review and criticism prior to the time that any
sales are permitted. Furthermore, investors in unregistered offerings are not
protected by the civil liability provision in Section 11 of the 1933 Act. The
provision imposes almost absolute liability on the issuer of securities that are
the subject of a registration statement which contained a misstatement of
material fact at the time it became effective." Because investors in
unregistered offerings do not enjoy these protections of registration, the
Commission has used certain limitations to safeguard members of the public,
especially the unsophisticated and inexperienced, from persons who might
otherwise exploit the opportunity to sell them unregistered securities. The
limitations chosen by the Commission include prohibitions against general
solicitation and general advertising in transactional exemptions.
Section 3(a)( 11) does not require the issuer to provide prospective
investors with prescribed disclosure and for that reason, presumably, it
places no limitations on the manner of offering. Regulation A also
exempts public offerings, but it resembles a registered offering by requiring
the filing of a simplified disclosure statement with one of the SEC's regional
offices and the delivery of copies of that statement to investors. Originally,
Regulation A prohibited any offers by the issuer or persons acting on its
behalf prior to the time that the prescribed offering circular had cleared
regional staff review. In 1979, the Commission amended Regulation A to
allow certain issuers to distribute a preliminary offering circular prior to the
commencement of formal selling.' In 1992, in an attempt to make the
exemption even more attractive to issuers, the SEC liberalized Regulation
A further by permitting issuers to "test the waters" by general solicitation
prior to any filing with the regional office.6' This amendment permits
issuers to determine whether the market is interested in an offering before
embarking on the time-consuming and expensive process of preparing the
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988) (providing for civil liability on account of a false registration
statement).
59. See, e.g., Sec. Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2276 (Dec. 6, 1961).
60. Sec. Act Release No. 6075, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,101 (June
1, 1979).
61. Sec. Act Release No. 6949, supra note 53, at 62,169.
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mandated offering statement.62 Not even issuers that are considering a
registered offering are granted this much flexibility during the pre-filing
stage of a transaction. Rule 504 is a third transactional exemption that
permits offerings to the public at large. Like the Section 3(a)(11)
exemption, Rule 504 is not conditioned on the disclosure of information to
investors. But unlike Section 3(a)(11), Rule 504, as adopted, proscribed
general advertising and general solicitation. In 1992 the SEC removed this
limitation on the manner of offering securities.63
Rules 505 and 506 continue to prohibit the use of general solicitation
and general advertising. However, in a series of interpretative letters, the
SEC staff has determined that the prohibition does not extend to "limited"
solicitation and "limited" advertising."M As articulated in administrative
correspondence with attorneys for prospective issuers, "limited" solicitation
and "limited" advertising consists of communications between the issuer or
its agent and any person with whom the issuer or its agent has a pre-existing
relationship that permits the offeror to know that the offeree is a
sophisticated or an accredited investor. As a result of these guidelines, an
issuer or a person acting on its behalf, such as a broker-dealer, can create
a pool of prospective investors prior to the time that a disclosure document
is available for offerees to inspect.
E. Resale Restrictions
Securities that are sold in registered public offerings may be resold
immediately in any manner and in any amount by any person who is not
deemed to be an affiliate of the issuer. Persons who are in control of the
issuer are considered affiliates and may resell registered securities
immediately, but only in quantities that do not represent another public
offering. As designed by Congress, Section 5 regulates public offerings by
affiliates in the same way as distributions by the issuers. Consequently, the
1933 Act contemplates restrictions on the resale of registered securities only
when the seller is an affiliate and when the volume is deemed to be
significant.65
62. See generally 7A HICKS, supra note 20, § 5.07[l][b].
63. Sec. Act Release No. 6949, supra note 53, at 62,170.
64. See 7A HICKS, supra note 20, § 7.03[4][a].
65. See generally 7B HICKS, supra note 20, § 9.03[4].
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Resale restrictions can also arise out of a transaction in which
unregistered securities are sold. Transactional exemptions contain one or
more limitations. Section 3(a)( 11) offerings are limited to residents, Rule
505 offerings are subject to the restriction of Section 3(b), which provides
for a limited public distribution, and Section 4(2) offerings, with or without
Rule 506, must be non-public. In order to ensure the limited nature of an
offering under these exemptions, the issuer is expected to take precautions
against premature resales by original purchasers. Purchasers in a Section
3(a)(l 1) offering, for example, may not immediately resell to nonresidents.
Otherwise, a purported intrastate offering would become in reality an
interstate offering, a transaction which Section 3(a)(1 1) does not exempt.
Similarly, qualified purchasers in a Rule 506 offering may not resell
immediately to unqualified purchasers. Otherwise, an issuer could use
Section 4(2) or Rule 506 to engage in a two-step public offering, a
transaction for which these exemptions are not available. In both instances,
as well as in Rule 505 transactions, the SEC has required purchasers to hold
the securities they purchased for a fixed period of time prior to reselling to
the public. The holding period requirement that attaches to each of these
exemptions is designed to prevent an allegedly limited offering from spilling
over to persons who need the protections of registration and disclosure
Securities subject to resale limitations imposed by the issuer are sometimes
referred to as restricted securities.
There are, then, two classes of persons who face resale limitations.
First, affiliates who hold registered securities or other unrestricted securities
must avoid resales that resemble public offerings. Second, affiliates and
nonaffiliates who hold restricted securities may not resell until after they
have held these securities for a period of time.
The SEC adopted Rule 144 to help persons faced with resale
limitations." The Rule provides objective guidelines that explain how and
when such persons may resell their securities to the public. It is conditioned
upon the availability of current and reliable information about the issuer,
which the issuer must publish on a regular basis,6 '7 and upon the resale of
the securities in a brokerage transaction. 68 Rule 144(d) addresses the issue
66. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, which was adopted in Sec. Act Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,487 (Jan. 11, 1972).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1993).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(0 (1993).
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of how long restricted securities must be held prior to resale by imposing
a two year holding period.69 Rule 144(e) fixes the volume of securities
that may safely be resold and not constitute a public offering.7" Paragraph
(e) thereby assists affiliates who hold restricted and unrestricted securities
and nonaffiliates who hold restricted securities. Like other administrative
rules, Rule 144 has been the subject of liberal revision. In a series of
amendments to Rule 144 since its adoption in 1972, the SEC has relaxed the
holding period requirement7" and increased, and in certain situations
eliminated, the resale volume limitations.72 It also added, by amendment,
Rule 144(k), which permits nonaffiliates who have held restricted securities
for a period of three years to resell publicly without any limitation on the
volume or the manner of resale and regardless of the general availability of
public information about the issuer.73
Securities sold pursuant to the intrastate exemption are technically not
restricted securities, as defined by Rule 144(a)(3), and therefore are not
subject to the holding period requirements of Rule 144(d). But these
securities are subject to resale limitations of a different sort. Section
3(a)( 11) requires not only that the securities be offered and sold in a single
state, but also that they come to rest in the hands of persons residing within
the state.74 Judicial interpretations of Section 3(a)(1 1) have made it clear
that when a single resident-purchaser makes a reoffer or resale to a person
outside the state prior to the time that the offering has come to rest, the
issuer loses its exemption, despite good faith efforts to control the
offering.75  An issuer that is unable to prove the availability of an
exemption for its unregistered offering is liable in rescission under Section
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (1993).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1993).
71. Sec. Act Release No. 6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,523
(Apr. 23, 1990).
72. See Sec. Act Release No. 5979, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,731
(Sept. 19, 1978); Sec. Act Release No. 5995, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,759
(Nov. 8, 1978).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k), which was added to Rule 144 in Sec. Act Release No. 6286, [1981
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,821 (Feb. 6, 1981). It was liberalized by Sec. Act
Release No. 6488, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,429 (Sept. 23, 1983) and
by Sec. Act Release No. 6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 184,523 (Apr. 23,
1990).
74. Sec. Act Release No. 1459, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2261 (May 29 1937).
75. See, e.g., Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582, 586 (8th Cir. 1965); SEC v. Los Angeles
Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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12(1) to all persons who purchase securities from it. Until 1974 when the
SEC adopted Rule 147 as a safe harbor rule for Section 3(a)(1 1), it was
generally assumed that the resident purchasers were required to wait one
year from the date of the last sale in the intrastate offering before reselling
to a nonresident.76 Information about the issuer, which is not required in
a primary intrastate offering, has never been required as a condition for
resale in the secondary market. In Rule 147(e), the SEC reduced the period
of time that resident purchasers must wait before reselling to nonresidents
from twelve to nine months after the last sale of securities in the primary
distribution area.77
Rule 504 permits nonreporting companies to sell one million dollars of
securities publicly each year without any disclosure. As adopted, this
exemption required the issuer to take precautions to ensure that purchasers
did not resell for at least two years following the sale. Because securities
sold in Rule 504 offerings were considered restricted for purposes of Rule
144, resales after two years were possible under Rule 144 only if the issuer
complied with the information requirements of Rule 144(c). In 1992, the
SEC amended Rule 504 and removed this limitation.7" Today, purchasers
in a Rule 504 offering may resell without any holding period, regardless of
whether the issuer has provided the secondary trading market with the type
of information that Rule 144(c) requires.
F. Private Rights of Action
The fundamental purpose of the federal securities laws is to ensure full
and fair disclosure and to protect investors from fraud in the public offering,
trading, voting, and tendering of securities. Private rights of action are an
important enforcement tool for the registration and antifraud provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act provides the only basis for a private
action for rescission or damages against a seller who has offered or sold
securities in violation of the registration requirements. In order to prevail
in a Section 12(1) claim, a purchaser is required to prove only that (1) a
76. The one year period was first suggested by the SEC in Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp.,
I S.E.C. 147, 163 (1935). See also Myer v. E.M. Adams & Co., 519 P.2d 375, 376 (Ore. 1974).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1993).
78. Sec. Act Release No. 6949, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72, 439 (July 30, 1992).
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registration statement covering the securities was not in effect, (2) the
defendant offered or sold the securities to the plaintiff, (3) the requisite
jurisdictional means were employed, and (4) the suit was commenced in a
timely manner.79 The burden of proof then shifts to the seller to prove that
the offer or sale was exempted from Section 5.
As a protective weapon, especially for ordinary investors, Section 12(1)
has been weakened by a series of judicial and administrative interpretations.
Prior to 1988, most federal courts permitted a Section 12(1) claimant to seek
relief from the issuer in a primary offering or from a collateral participant
in the transaction, such as an officer, director, general partner, attorney or
accountant, who was judged to be a substantial factor in causing the
unlawful sale to occur. 8' However, in Pinter v. Dahl,81 the Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of potential defendants to a Section 12(1) claim.
It decided that Section 12(1) liability extends only to the person who passes
title to the security and to the person "who successfully solicits the purchase,
motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or
those of the securities owner.' '8 2 Lower courts have relied upon Pinter to
restrict Section 12(1) liability in most instances to the technical owner of the
security.83  Thus, as a practical matter, purchasers in an unregistered
securities offering by the issuer will be limited to a claim against that seller
and, even where the issuer is insolvent, they will no longer be able to reach
the owners or principals.
SEC interpretations of transactional exemptions have also undermined
the forcefulness of Section 12(1). In addition to liberalizing conditions of
particular exemptions, the Commission has eased the issuer's burden of
proving the availability of an exemption, first, by restating exemption
limitations with objective standards, and second, by providing in many of
the administrative rules that an issuer's reasonable belief that it has satisfied
particular conditions will suffice.' Earlier constructions of the
79. See generally 17 J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION
UNDER THE 1933 ACT § 5.01 (Clark Boardman Callaghan Securities Law Series, rev'd ed. 1993)
[hereinafter HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES].
80. Id. at §§ 5.04[2] and 6.03[4].
81. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
82. Id. at 647.
83. See generally 17A HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES, supra note 79, at § 6.03[5].
84. See, e.g., Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) which specifies the nature of purchasers that are permitted under
the non-exclusive safe harbor rule for Section 4(2). Under the statutory exemption, an issuer is required
to prove that every purchaser was in fact able to fend for himself or herself. But in claiming an
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transactional exemptions that issuers usually invoke in primary offerings
placed the issuer at risk under Section 12(1) if all of the exemption
conditions were not met, even if the issuer had acted reasonably or in good
faith. Finally, the SEC has amended Regulation A85 and Regulation D16
(under which Rules 504, 505, and 506 are subsumed) to provide issuers with
a defense to a suit for rescission under Section 12(1). This administrative
relief was added in response to critics of the traditional interpretations of
transactional exemptions under which any failure by the issuer to satisfy the
conditions of an exemption resulted in the loss of that exemption for the
entire transaction and gives all of the purchasers in that transaction a cause
of action for rescission under Section 12(1). Reformists criticized the
severity of this view by pointing to certain offerings which were otherwise
in complete compliance with an exemption, but lost the exemption as a
result of an inadvertent failure to comply with some condition that was
immaterial to the offering as a whole. Under the safe harbor rules that are
now available to an issuer in an offering under Regulation A or Rules 504,
505, or 506 of Regulation D, an issuer's failure to comply with a term,
condition, or requirement of one of these exemptions does not cause a loss
of the exemption for any offer or sale to a particular individual or entity if
the issuer can demonstrate that first, the term, condition, or requirement
violated was not directly intended to protect the complaining party, second,
the failure to comply was insignificant to the offering as a whole, and third,
the issuer made a good faith and reasonable effort to comply with all the
terms, conditions, and requirements. Although the safe harbor rules do not
insulate an issuer from SEC enforcement action, they significantly reduce
the potential liability that an issuer of unregistered securities faces under
Section 12(l)."
Private rights of action against an issuer who engages in fraudulent sales
activity as part of a primary offering can be brought under Sections 11 and
12(2) of the 1933 Act and under Rule lOb-5 of Section 10(b) of the 1934
exemption under Rule 506, an issuer must prove either that each purchaser satisfies the conditions of
paragraph (b)(2)(ii), or that "the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale that
such purchaser comes within this description." Id.
85. Sec. Act Release No. 6949, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72, 439 (July 30, 1992). The safe-
harbor rule for Regulation A is found in 17 C.F.R. § 230.260 (1993).
86. Sec. Act Release No. 6825, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,404 (Mar.
14, 1989). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1993).
87. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.260 and 230.508 (1993).
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Act. Judicial interpretations of these civil liability provisions, however, have
reduced their effectiveness for investors."8  The combined loss in
effectiveness under these provisions and under Section 12(1) translates into
a reduction in the level of deterrence against fraud and registration
violations. Ordinary individual investors, who lack the sophistication,
experience, and bargaining power that institutions use to help protect
themselves, inevitably are the biggest losers.
G. Summary
This broad survey of five categories of regulation in primary offerings
of securities that appear in the sections on Nature and Quantity of Investors
through Private Rights of Action, parts I. B through I. F, supra, provides
ample evidence that ordinary investors have less protection today than in
earlier periods of SEC administration of the 1933 Act. Restrictions on the
nature and quantity of investors under Sections 3(a)( 11) and 4(2) have been
relaxed. Disclosure in registered offerings, through the use of a statutory
prospectus, is not required in all transactions and, where required, may occur
after an investor has decided to purchase. Furthermore, the quality of
disclosure in a prospectus, both in terms of content and manner of
presentation, does not always assist unsophisticated investors. In
unregistered offerings, an issuer can avoid any duties of disclosure by
relying upon Section 3(a)(1 1) or Rule 504. Other transactional exemptions,
such as Regulation A and Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D require some
form of disclosure by the issuer, but the benefits of this form of protection
depend on when an investor makes an investment decision. All three of
these exemptions permit the issuer to persuade offerees of the merits of an
offering without the use of a disclosure document. Regulation A allows the
issuer to "test the waters" prior to preparation of a disclosure document,
while Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, which are unconcerned with
offerees, require delivery of a disclosure document only where the purchaser
fails to qualify as an accredited investor, a category that equates wealth with
sophistication. Limitations on the manner of sale, once considered a
necessary restraint on issuers in order for disclosure obligations to succeed,
are being modified or withdrawn from securities law. Regulation A now
88. For a discussion of how investors have lost protection under Section 1Ob-5 see Hicks,
Securities Regulation: Challenges in the Decades Ahead, 68 IND. L.J. 791, 808-10 (1993).
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permits offers to any potential investor even before the issuer has decided
to prepare a disclosure document. Rule 504 no longer contains a ban on
general advertising and general solicitation. Under administrative
interpretations of Regulation D, issuers in Rule 505 and 506 offerings may
engage in advertising and solicitation provided that it is "limited." Resale
limitations survive as protection against indirect public offerings by issuers
or affiliates without disclosure of material information, but amendments to
Rule 144 have undercut some of the effectiveness that these restrictions once
possessed. Finally, private rights of action under Sections 12(1) and 12(2)
of the 1933 Act are less potent today as weapons against registration
violations and fraud. Safe-harbor rules adopted by the SEC give defendants
to such lawsuits more protection and judicial interpretations of civil liability
provisions have narrowed the scope of potential defendants and increased
the burden of proof for investors bringing suit.
II.
As Part I demonstrates, ordinary investors in the market of primary
offerings of securities have experienced a decline in protection as a result
of judicial and administrative interpretations of various provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts. This reduction of investor protection was aided by a
political climate that supported deregulation as the means for eliminating the
financial woes of business, especially unseasoned companies seeking access
to the capital markets. In recent years, it also has been spurred on by fears
that U.S. regulatory policies were interfering with this country's ability to
compete internationally in the financial and securities markets. The issue
then is clear. As a preliminary matter, the problem is to determine how
U.S. policymakers are to respond to the demands of international regulatory
competition and whether the response necessarily entails a reduction in
protection for ordinary investors. Assuming that ordinary investors must
experience a decline in protection under federal securities law, the problem
then is to decide whether that result is fair given the legislative goals of the
federal securities statutes. Although these questions are relevant to all
aspects of U.S. securities law, they are considered here only in the context
of the 1933 Act as it applies to primary offerings of securities.
The registration and prospectus delivery obligations of Section 5 apply
to foreign issuers which offer securities: within the United States, abroad
under circumstances such that they are likely to flow back to the United
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States, or in transactions that may be designed for foreign investors, but
have a jurisdictional connection with the United States. 9 Of course, where
Section 5 applies to a foreign issuer's offering, most of the transactional
exemptions discussed earlier might be available as an alternative to filing a
registration statement.9' Foreign issuers which are confronted with the
application of U.S. securities laws to their proposed offerings might choose
to avoid selling securities in this country when the costs and burdens of the
regulatory system in another nation's market are lower than those associated
with the United States. Even domestic issuers in search of capital have this
choice of regulation to consider in deciding where to market their securities.
Foreign jurisdictions that offer efficient markets, but less onerous regulation
than the United States, will have a competitive advantage over the United
States; this will produce a loss of business for U.S. participants in the capital
markets. In view of the world-wide competition among capital markets and
among government regulatory policies, U.S. policymakers have several
choices in deciding how to respond to international public offerings which,
under domestic securities law, would have to be made pursuant to a
registration statement, including:
(1) Adhere to rigorous standards of disclosure and protection for
investors. This position assumes that U.S. regulatory policies are superior
to those of foreign countries and that all investors are best served by having
securities, including those issued by foreign firms, accurately priced and by
having the best protection in place for both unsophisticated and sophisticated
investors. Although U.S. securities laws are no doubt the toughest in the
world, it is unclear whether toughness translates into superiority. Even
assuming that U.S. securities laws are superior, it is not clear that any
modification of standards or regulations applicable to public offerings would
significantly alter their status. Certainly, the SEC has not been reluctant to
reduce disclosure and registration exemption requirements during the past
89. The extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws, especially the 1933 Act, was the topic of
Sec. Act Release No. 6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,524 (Apr. 24,
1990).
90. Section 3(a)(l 1) is unavailable to foreign corporate issuers because it requires a corporate
issuer to be incorporated in the state where the offering is to occur. Even where a foreign issuer is a
noncorporate person, it would most likely fail the doing business requirement of Section 3(a)(l 1).
Regulation A is also unavailable to any foreign issuer except one that is qualified as a Canadian issuer.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (1993).
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twenty-five years. Indeed, all of the Commission's revised and amended
rules are announced as "consistent with the protection of investors."
(2) Maintain the current regulatory scheme but allow for ad hoc
exceptions. This approach introduces politics into the regulatory system in
a blatant manner that could easily prompt retaliation by foreign governments
against U.S. firms seeking to sell securities abroad. Furthermore, unless this
approach were applied to both domestic and foreign issuers, it would not
eliminate the competitive advantage that foreign countries with less onerous
regulation presently enjoy. But, an administrative system that allowed for
ad hoc exceptions for some but not all U.S. issuers would be indefensible.
(3) Modify U.S. standards for certain categories of issuers irrespective
of where they are organized and do business. The SEC has adopted this
approach for addressing some of the problems that are created by
international competition for capital markets. It created a series of
registration forms for certain foreign issuers which serve as counterparts to
Forms S-1-2-3 for U.S. issuers.9' These special forms, Forms F-1-2-3,92
relax certain aspects of the disclosure obligations that the 1933 Act and the
SEC regulations impose on registrants. The modified disclosure forms can
be used by any issuer that qualifies as a "foreign private issuer." An issuer
organized outside of the United States is not a foreign private issuer if (1)
more than fifty percent of the outstanding voting securities are owned,
directly or through voting trust certificates or depositary receipts, by
residents of the United States, and (2) if any one of the following apply: (i)
the majority of the executive officers or directors are United States citizens
or residents, (ii) more than fifty percent of the assets of the issuer are
located in the United States, or (iii) the business of the issuer is administered
principally in the United States.93 In other words, the F forms can be used
by foreign issuers that are truly foreign.
Although this approach does not discriminate by company or by country
of organization, as approach (2), supra, likely would, it has at least two
problems. First, to effectively compete with the regulatory policies of
foreign countries, this approach must provide disclosure standards that are
significantly less demanding than current U.S. standards. The F Forms offer
real advantages to foreign issuers, but the level of mandated disclosure
91. Sec. Act Release No. 6437, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,407 (Nov. 19, 1982).
92. See 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) IN 6952, 6962, and 6972, respectively.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (1993).
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required by those forms is not much different from the regular S Forms used
by domestic issuers. Second, this approach, as implemented by the SEC,
leaves domestic issuers with the more onerous disclosure standards thereby
creating higher costs of compliance for domestic issuers that register under
the Act than those that exist for foreign issuers. Thus, the existing double
standard of regulation fails to address the competitive advantage of certain
foreign markets with lower regulatory costs, and their ability to attract
United States issuers away from domestic markets.
(4) Adopt disclosure standards on a reciprocal basis with participating
countries. This approach contemplates agreement between the United States
and interested foreign countries under which each party to the agreement
would accept the regulatory system of the other countries. For example, in
a multinational public offering in the United States and country X, the
United States would accept the disclosure document as prepared and
qualified under the regulations of country X and, for its part, country X
would reciprocate by accepting a prospectus meeting the requirements of the
1933 Act. In 1991, the United States and Canada entered into such a
reciprocal arrangement under which each country is to accept for certain
issuers, which are engaged in cross-border public offerings, the disclosure
document prepared and reviewed under the laws and procedures of the home
country. 94 Although this multijurisdictional disclosure system has the
advantage of simplicity, it does not address the competitive disadvantage
that the United States faces with domestic issuers that must accept the
heavier regulatory burdens for securities offerings that occur in whole or in
part in this country. Furthermore, unless certain minimum disclosure or
eligibility standards are included in such reciprocal agreements, U.S.
investors might be exposed to serious investment risks.
(5) Harmonize disclosure standards. U.S. policymakers under this
solution to international regulatory competition would reevaluate domestic
disclosure standards and harmonize them and other domestic regulatory
principles with those of all major countries. Efforts towards the creation of
uniform disclosure standards for multinational securities offerings have
already begun under the auspices of IOSCO. If fully implemented, this
approach would provide standardization and thus eliminate regulatory
competition. But, given the gulf that exists between the regulatory system
94. Sec. Act Release No. 6902, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,812 (June
21, 1991).
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of the United States and that of countries with developed or developing
capital markets, it seems too much to expect that the ideals reflected in
international harmonization of securities laws will be realized soon.
For a variety of reasons, some of which are set forth above, none of the
five proposals represents a realistic solution to the international regulatory
competition that U.S. securities law presently encounters. Furthermore, none
of them confronts the related issue of investor protection that distinguishes
between sophisticated and unsophisticated participants in the investment
markets. The proposal to be described next attempts to address both aspects
of the regulatory problem. It is premised, however, on several assumptions.
First, a single solution to all facets of international securities regulatory
competition is not possible nor even desirable. Public and private interests
in the securities markets can vary significantly among particular areas of
regulation. A regulatory decision with respect to one area of securities
regulation, such as insider trading, may represent a fair compromise of those
interests domestically and serve as a competitive policy or standard
internationally. However, it might fail as a solution to conflicts in
international regulation in other areas of securities law, such as minimum net
capital requirements for broker-dealer firms. Even the general topic of
controlling primary offerings that is the focal point of this article is
complicated by the close relationship that it has with the issue of regulating
secondary trading activity. Viable methods for reducing competitive
disadvantages in domestic regulation of issuer-initiated securities offerings
and providing adequate protection to vulnerable investors in those offerings
may not serve as models for dealing with matters of global competition and
investor protection in regulating domestic secondary trading activities by
market intermediaries and investors generally.
Second, in order to produce a successful solution to competing
principles of securities regulation, even in the narrowest aspect of law, all
levels of domestic regulation must be coordinated. A major impediment to
U.S. efforts at reconciling its securities laws with those of competing
countries is the magnitude and duplication of our regulation. A proposed
public offering by an issuer can be subject to regulations, interpretations or
policies that are the product of decisions by the SEC, one or more stock
exchanges, federal and state judges, the NASD, and administrative agencies
in each state where the offering is to occur. If the issuer is a financial
institution, one or more federal banking authorities will influence the nature
of the transaction. Separate tiers of domestic regulation is probably
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inevitable and maybe even necessary. For example, state securities laws
offer forms of investor protection that federal securities laws are unable to
provide effectively or efficiently." The key is to minimize duplication and
costs and maximize uniformity in regulatory standards.
Third, total parity in regulation throughout the world never will be
possible. Even if harmonization of standards is achieved, as suggested in
proposal (5) supra, national and local business customs and practices as well
as more formal restraints will continue to prevail as points of reference in
distinguishing one national market from another. For example, the tradition
of private litigation in the United States as a source of preserving one's
property rights does not exist in some of the countries, such as Canada and
the United Kingdom, where competing securities markets thrive. And yet,
it is an important variable in the domestic regulatory system that is likely
to survive reforms in our international securities law.
Fourth, any workable solution that fairly integrates and reconciles
international principles of securities law cannot be expected to survive
without periodic reexamination and reform. Regulatory policies and
procedures are crafted for specific activities, problems, and abuses. Changes
in government, business, and in economies throughout the world will
provide continuous pressures for any regulatory scheme.
Finally, the complexity of investment opportunities is likely to intensify
and the number of those opportunities that can be adequately assessed
directly by ordinary investors is likely to decrease. The continuing increase
in institutional ownership and trading of securities is due in part to the
economics of information and the wide-spread acceptance of the portfolio
theory. It is also the result of the superior collective knowledge, experience,
and bargaining power that institutions possess. In many of the future
financial and securities markets, individual investor participation is likely to
be de minimus.
The proposal that follows is limited by the assumptions set forth above.
It speaks only to the issue of primary offerings by issuers and to the level
of protection to be accorded ordinary investors in the United States. In
short, it seems preferable for U.S. policymakers to reform securities law as
it applies to primary offerings by distinguishing among the various markets
95. For a contrary view, see B.J. Fahmey, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal
Pre-Emption Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 NEV. V. L. REv. 753
(1992).
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for new issues. In those markets where ordinary individual investors are
significant participants, or are likely to become significant, regulatory
standards should provide those investors with a fair level of protection. On
the other hand, for those markets where institutional and other sophisticated
investors predominate, and thus require less protection, regulatory standards
should be fixed with those participants in mind. In articulating standards
and procedures in terms of such stratified markets, domestic policymakers
will have greater flexibility to adapt regulatory policies to the competing
markets and regulations of foreign countries. Furthermore, because domestic
policy will be shaped in reference to particular categories of investors, either
institutional or individual, there should be less risk that investor protection,
as an important goal of federal securities law, will be overlooked.
Implications of this proposal can be seen by considering how it might
affect a registered public offering. Under current securities law, the issuer
would file a registration statement with a disclosure statement prepared for
the ordinary reasonable investor. Under the proposal, a determination would
be made as to whether the proposed offering was likely to interest individual
investors. Initial public offerings of equity securities, especially so-called
penny stock and blank check offerings, or offerings of interests in mutual
funds traditionally have attracted a significant percentage of individual
investors.96 In such instances, more rigorous standards and procedures of
the type in existence are appropriate. If, however, the proposed offering
involves high-grade debt securities or American Depositary Receipts
("ADRs"),97 where institutional investors purchase the lion's share of the
issue, traditional standards and procedures could be relaxed or eliminated.
For example, where offerings were aimed at large, sophisticated investors,
the standard of disclosure for registration statements (the ordinary reasonable
investor) would refer to an institution. Consequently, the prospectus for
such an offering would have a different appearance from the document that
96. For a discussion of the risks that individual investors face in these offerings, see Blank
Check Offerings, Sec. Act Release No. 6932, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,937
(Apr. 13, 1992); Penny Stock Market Fraud: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 21 and Sept. 7,
1989).
97. For a discussion of ADRs, see Sec. Act Release No. 6894, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,740 (May 23, 1991). The SEC estimated that only 15% to 20% of the ADR market
is made up of individual investors and that the remainder consists of institutions or brokers. Typically,
brokers are engaged in arbitrage. Sec. Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,591 (Mar. 8, 1982).
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is prepared in an IPO. In many respects, Rule 415 offerings under existing
law reflect this change in format and content for registered issues aimed at
institutions.98 However, by adopting regulations that explicitly distinguish
among prospective purchasers, rather than among categories of issuers,
which is the method that is used under Rule 415, the SEC could reduce
more of the burdens of registration.
Similar reform is possible for issuer offerings of unregistered securities.
Certain unregistered offerings by issuers, such as private placements by
unseasoned companies and rollups of limited partnerships, are directed at
individual investors where tighter regulatory policies are in order.99
However, other unregistered securities offerings are within the domain of
institutional investors. Capital markets of this type include the money
market, the bond market, and various markets for so-called derivative
instruments such as futures, options, forward contracts, and currency and
interest-rate swaps."° Where a market is predominantly or exclusively for
institutional investors, transactional exemptions should be tailored
accordingly. For example, Rule 506 has moved in this direction by
eliminating some of the burdens of traditional private placement law (no
mandated disclosure and an unlimited number of purchasers) for transactions
where the purchasers are institutions. The safe harbor rule that protects
issuers from liability for insubstantial and inadvertent failures to satisfy all
of the conditions of Regulation D would also assist a Rule 506 issuer. Such
protection seems justified where the private placement is predominantly
institutional, but it might be unwarranted where the Rule 506 issue is sold
principally to nonaccredited individuals. Comparable reforms in some of the
other exemptions are possible.
Rule 144A is an exemption from the 1933 Act registration requirements
that demonstrates the viability of this proposal for regulation defined by the
nature of the investors involved.' The Rule provides a nonexclusive safe
harbor from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act for resales of
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1993).
99. See, e.g., Limited Partnership Rollup Reform Act of 1993, Senate Report No. 103-121, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,216 (Aug. 3, 1993).
100. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION
77 (7th ed. 1992).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A, adopted in Sec. Act Release No. 6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,523 (Apr. 23, 1990).
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certain restricted securities to any "qualified institutional buyer"
("QIBs").10 2  Thus, the exemption is available for securities trades in a
market occupied exclusively by institutions, i.e., QIBs. In most instances,
there are no disclosure obligations.1 13 The SEC anticipates that Rule 144A
will become "the first step toward achieving a more liquid and efficient
resale market for unregistered securities."' 4  Although the Rule is
unavailable to an issuer of registered securities, it offers many potential
benefits to the issuer of unregistered securities. A domestic issuer is
permitted to sell its unregistered securities, pursuant to Section 4(2) or Rule
506, for example, to an investment banking firm that immediately resells
them into the Rule 144A market. In effect, the investment banker functions
as a firm commitment underwriter of securities earmarked for institutional
purchasers. Because the QIBs which purchase the restricted securities from
the intermediary firm are able to resell immediately to other QIBs in the
Rule 144A market, the cost of funds to the issuer is less than it would be
in a conventional private placement where purchasers would be saddled with
a two year holding period before being able to resell the restricted securities
into a public market. The Rule also provides an eligible foreign issuer with
easier access to investment funds controlled by large institutions in a private
market that U.S. institutional investors might prefer to unfamiliar markets
overseas.
III. CONCLUSION
U.S. securities markets are straining from the pressures of global
competition for access to capital with a minimum of governmental
regulation. All investments carry risk, but in enacting legislation in 1933
and 1934, Congress sought to protect U.S. investors by providing a
regulatory scheme that assures full and fair disclosure of material facts in
the purchasing, trading, voting and tendering of securities.
102. For the definition of a QIB, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(I)(i) (1993). See also, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144A(d) (1993) (conditions which must be met for the exemption, including offering the securities
to a QIB); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(b) and (c) (1993) (the safe harbor provisions).
103. Disclosure obligations arise only where the issuer is not a 1934 Act registrant or a foreign
private issuer exempt from the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act through Rule 12g3-2(b). 17
C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4) (1993).
104. Sec. Act Release No. 6862, supra note 101, at 80,639.
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The Securities Act of 1933 was concerned with the protection of
investors, primarily unsophisticated individual investors, in large public
offerings of securities. It also authorized the SEC to adopt exemptions from
the disclosure obligations of public offerings in those transactions where
such regulation was unnecessary. In the sixty years since the enactment of
this federal statute, the level of protection for ordinary individual investors
has declined. In part, this change in protection is explained by changes in
the financial and securities markets, both domestic and foreign. The market
contemplated by Congress in 1933 was one composed primarily of equity
securities where new issues were offered to ordinary individuals. Since that
time, individual investors constitute a minority of the owners and traders of
equity securities behind insurance companies, mutual and pension funds, and
other institutional investors. Furthermore, the number and variety of
investment vehicles and specialized markets that are available today call for
a regulatory response that is different from the approach that was prompted
by the needs of the 1930s. Changes in the form of investment vehicles and
in the markets where they trade require a reassessment of how ordinary
individual investors in primary offerings should be protected in the context
of international business and regulatory competition.
Several solutions to the problem are possible and some have been the
subject of SEC experimentation. An optimal approach must proceed on
certain assumptions regarding the scope and duration of the proposed
solution, the need for a cooperative effort among all levels of federal and
state regulators, the likelihood of eliminating all foreign competitive
advantages, and the limited role that ordinary investors are likely to play in
future securities markets. Subject to these assumptions, the preferred
approach for U.S. policymakers seeking to adapt domestic securities
regulation to the forces of international business and regulatory competition
is to shape standards and procedures to fit the constituents of each carefully
defined market. Markets should be defined in terms of the character of the
investors that predominate there. More safeguards in standards and
procedures are appropriate in markets dominated by unsophisticated
individuals. Other markets, including some that might be created by the
regulation itself, which are controlled by institutional investors, should be
subjected to less rigorous standards and procedures. In theory and in
practice, institutional investors can rely upon experience, knowledge, and
bargaining power to protect themselves. A bifurcated regulatory system, of
the type proposed, should provide U.S. policymakers more flexibility to
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restructure domestic capital markets and domestic regulatory policies to
compete in a global economy that continues to develop.

